Preventing biological risks increased by environmental AND CLIMATE CHANGE



through EU CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative (Instrument for Stability and Peace, IcSP):

THE LARGEST EXTERNAL CIVIL SECURITY PROGRAM







CBN WMD and CBR terrorism: some common factors

> DEEP REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DESTABILIZATION



> THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY



➤ NEED FOR RESPONSE, BUT COULD BE DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY AGGRESSOR (ESPECIALLY IN

TERRORISM CASE => NEBULA OF ACTORS AND NETWORKS)









CBN WMD and CBR terrorism: some differences

> CBN WMD AND DELIVERY MEANS STATE

ACTORS: THE DEVELOPMENT IS A LONG, COMPLEX AND THUS COSTLY PROCESS THAT CANNOT NOT BE SET UP WITHOUT A STRONG POLITICAL WILLINGNESS



- IDEOLOGICAL/POLITICAL E.G. WHITE SUPREMACISTS, XENOPHOBIC, EXTREME RIGHT, EXTREME LEFT, ANARCHIST...,
- **ECONOMICAL** *e.g.* STAFF FROM SENSITIVE INDUSTRIAL PLANTS,...
- RELIGIOUS/MILLENARIST E.G. AUM SHINRIKYO,...













N WMD and CBR terrorism: a major difference

• N WMD ⇔ DETERRENCE [P5 AS RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES ACCORDING TO NPT]: THE POWER LIES IN THE POSSESSION OF THE WEAPON



• CBR TERRORISM: THE POWER LIES IN THE USE OF THE WEAPON





CBR terrorism: generic actions modes





• C WMD AND C TERRORISM: SOME COMMON COMPOUNDS (MUSTARDS, NEUROTOXIC ORGANO-PHOSPHORUS,...), OTHER DIFFERENT (TOXIC


INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS)








• B: SAME MICROORGANISMS AND TOXINS, BUT FROM DIFFERENT QUALITY SO FAR









CBR terrorism: which perspective?





CONVENTIONAL TERRORISM VERSUS CBR TERRORISM: TOWARDS THE SAME PARADIGM SHIFT? I.E. MASS SCALE (BALI, MADRID, LONDON, PARIS, BRUSSELS, NICE,...)?







M. AHMET ÜZÜMCÜ, OPCW GENERAL DIRECTOR IN OCTOBER 2017:

« What is important to emphasize is that chemical terrorism is no longer a theoretical risk, but a very real threat. In Syria, as in Iraq, Daesh used Sulphur mustard.

In Europe, [as everywhere in the world] there is a growing concern that foreign fighters currently active in conflict areas will return to their home countries with the know-how and motivation to conduct









CONSEQUENCES)

HAZARDS)

NATURE OF THE THREAT

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

1/30/2020





POTENTIAL SEVERITY (GEOGRAPHIC EXTENT AND DECONTAMINATION

POTENTIAL SEVERITY (MORTALITY, MORBIDITY, NUMBER OF VICTIMS)

FIRST RESPONDERS INTERVENTION DIFFICULTIES (INCLUDING POTENTIAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON GOVERNMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

CONVENTIONAL

Low

EXTREME

EXTREME

BELATEDLY KNOWN/ UNKNOWN

EXTREME

HIGH

EXTREME

EXTREME

TYPE OF ATTACK

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL

Medium

Medium

Known (in principle)

Low (in principle)

Absent

Low

HIGH

LIKELIHOOD

POTENTIAL HAZARDS FOR HOSPITAL WORKERS

HIGH







"We will make you check everything and anything you eat out of fear, horror and terror"

"We will never allow you to enjoy the taste of what you desire"



"Sprinkle the liquid substances or the basics of bacteria with drinking water to take effect automatically"

- 1. STRONG IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATION, HATE, DESTRUCTION WILLINGNESS
- 2. FUNDS
- 3. Brains: Scientists, including foreign ones
- 4. THE COLLAPSE OF THE TERRITORIAL CONTROL,
 THE DEATH OF AL BAGHDADI IS NOT THE END OF
 THE REMAINING BRAINS...





CBR terrorism: which risks?





A terrorist act succeeds in the banality of the **EVERYDAY LIFE GESTURES**...

Vulnerabilities of targets: e.g. mass gathering, major events such as football world cup, world exhibition

CONTACT POISONING (e.g. chemical compounds on surfaces contacts,...)





- INFECTIOUS DISEASE VECTOR BORNE (e.g. insects, rodents, human,...
- AIRBORNE THREATS (e.g. drone, spreading planes, portable spray or diffuser, IED, rockets, tank trucks, sensitive infrastructures --i.e. chemical plants,...-)











CBR terrorism: which risks?





FOOD SUPPLY THREATS AS DAY-TO-DAY ACTIVITIES











Transport



Primary production

Manufacturing











Preparation

Distribution

Consumer




CBR terrorism: which risks?





WATER SUPPLY THREATS





Crossed objectives





FOOD QUALITY

FOOD SAFETY

The protection of food products from contamination or adulteration intended to cause public health harm or economic disruption

FOOD DEFENSE

The protection of food products from unintentional contamination







KEY INSTRUMENT

ENABLING EU TO PLAY A

MAJOR ROLE

IN PREVENTING AND PREPARING FOR ACTUAL OR EMERGING CRISES














Intentionally
Accidentally
Naturally
created

CBRN risks

Centres of Excellence REGIONAL SECRETARIATS OF THE EU CBRN COLORS OF THE EU CBRN COLORS



A LOCAL WORLDWIDE NETWORK



Nairobi | Kenya

Abu Dhabi | United Arab Emirates

The CoE is a global network of local experts and collaborating partners. Working in partnership with countries encourages local ownership through CBRN needs assessments, action plans, policies and projects.



IMPLEMENTATION OBJECTIVES





SHARING A COMMON EUROPEAN CULTURE OF

CBRN SAFETY & SECURITY

Prevention, Detection, Preparedness and Response

<=> CBRN risks mitigation, ACCORDINGTO A TAILORED APPROACH

BY:

INCREASING PREPAREDNESS

AT LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEVEL;

HARMONISING RESOURCES

WITHIN THE EU; AND


EXPORTING BEST PRACTICE

AND LESSONS LEARNED...

Centres International CBRN-CoE NETWORK










Centres lence NATIONAL COORDINATION AT PARTNER LEVELS









FACTS AND FIGURES





* Launch in 2010 - first contacts and presentation of the initiative 2007-2009


- * First CoE projects 2011
- * 182,1 M€ for 82 CoE projects (5 CB, 36 CBRN, 6 C, 23 B, 8 RN, 4 CRN)
- * 61 countries (+ 1 candidate = Chad)

Centres Countries of the CBRN COE of THE LINE COUNTRIES OF THE CBRN COE OF THE





COE PARTNER COUNTRIES IN AFRICAN ATLANTIC FACADE





COE PARTNER COUNTRIES IN NORTH AFRICA AND SAHEL











Jordan

















of Saudi Arabia

COE PARTNER COUNTRIES IN SOUTH EAST ASIA REGION



Lebanon

Lao PDR

Malaysia

Mvanmar



Vietnam

COE PARTNER COUNTRIES IN SOUTH EAST AND EASTERN EUROPE REGION





Iraq

















Albania

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Bosnia and Herzegovina

FYR of Macedonia

Georgia

Moldova Montenegro

Serbia

Ukraine

Arab

Emirates


Centres Centres of Excellence of Excellence

Centres of Excellence REMINDER OF THE SPECTRUM OF BIOLOGICAL RISKS





GLOBAL NATURAL BIORISKS



BIOSECURITY BIOSAFETY





PROLIFERATION

BIOTERRORISM

VANDALISM

ACCIDENTS SABOTAGE

NEGLIGENCE

PANDEMIC

NATURAL CONSEQUENCES
DISEASE
OUTBREAK

Whole spectrum of B threat (from natural to human-induced risks)<=> There is not one size fits all.

Need cooperation with WHO, FAO, OIE...

=> Actions to reduce biothreats and biorisk contribute to the biodefense
BUT: to avoid strategic surprise => keep in mind and on the table the great difference between the
30/01/269nsequences of unintentional use and malevolent use of micro-organism!



THE SPECTRUM OF BIOLOGICAL RISKS





STRATEGIC CONTEXT:

DISTURBANCE OF ECOSYSTEMS, OCEAN ACIDIFICATION, SUPPRESSION OF SPECIES OR, ON THE CONTRARY, PROLIFERATION OF OTHERS... GLOBAL WARMING DISRUPTS AND THREATENS THE WORLD OF LIFE

Global environmental changes: a major destabilisation factor





On ecosystems; on movement of animal species; on expansion of harmful species; on rise of the oceans with some more extreme weather events => increase of --both new and re-emerging-- infectious diseases. These extreme weather patterns introduce new climates to different regions able to sustain vectors, or introduce and survival of new vectors;

= => can likely to lead to major movements of population.



THE SPECTRUM OF BIOLOGICAL RISKS







 Globalization of trade and travel: impact on health threats reaches speeder and wider that ever;



- Population displacement, epidemics, can also be catastrophic if accompanied by armed conflict or terrorist destabilization;
- Unstable regions do not allow timely intervention to contain the crisis (Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo). Some terrorist groups may try to capitalize on such effects...



ENSURE AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE

TO MAJOR THREATS TO PUBLIC HEALTH.





INCLUDING SUDDEN EPIDEMICS WITH A POTENTIAL TRANSNATIONAL IMPACT

=> increased health risks (due to the spread of human, animal or plants diseases in new areas, as well as due to vector-borne diseases).

IN ANY CASE, EARLY DETECTION OF AND RESPONSE TO A CHANGING PICTURE OF DISEASES IS A KEY ELEMENT OF HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH STRATEGY TO ENSURE DISEASE AWARENESS AND PREPAREDNESS.

ONE HEALTH APPROACH IS KEY.

THE THEMATIC STRATEGIC PAPER **2014-2020** FOR THE ISCP CALLS FOR SUPPORT TO:

- GLOBAL DISEASE SURVEILLANCE
 - EMERGENCY PLANNING
 - > EARLY WARNING, ALERT AND REPORTING SYSTEMS
 - DISEASE OUTBREAK CONTAINMENT



THE SPECTRUM OF BIOLOGICAL RISKS





MediLabSecure, MediPIET and STRONGLABS

have been oriented towards taking into account the effects of

climate change on infectious diseases, the migration of potential

vectors and the alert capacity of laboratories and institutions in

charge of field epidemiology to prevent epidemics of new types




THREE LINES OF ACTION





THE CORE OF THE EU HEALTH CRISIS PREVENTION STRATEGY





ONE HEALTH APPROACH







Principles

ONE HEALTH ...is an approach of improving health and well-being through the prevention of risk and the mitigation of effects of crises (e.g. emerging diseases) that originate at the interface between humans, animals and their various environments

(Stone Mountain Process Atlanta USA 2012)

... the desired impact of the ONE HEALTH APPROACH expected through intersectoral integration can only be achieved if also the capacities of each involved sector are sufficiently strong and developed


Häsler B, Gilbert W, Jones BA, Pfeiffer DU, Rushton J, Otte MJ. The economic value of One Health in relation to the mitigation of zoonotic disease risks. Curr Top Microbiol Immunol. 2012;365:127–51).



ONE HEALTH APPROACH







Network for promoting a One
Health approach to mitigate
biological risks related to
emerging vector-borne viruses in
the Mediterranean, Black Sea &
Sahel regions

Coordination by Pasteur Institute and implementation by 5 European partner institutes





« Preventing biological risks increased by environmental and climate change in the Mediterranean, Black Sea and Sahel regions by strengthening institutional capacities in the context of ONE HEALTH »

Collaboration between MediLabSecure and MediPIET is crucial to ensure necessary links between lab capabilities and field epidemiologists









MEDIPIET P74 (2019-2021, 1 859 800 €)





« Mediterranean and Black Sea field epidemiology TRAINING programme network to increase security in the EU neighbourhood »



Enhancing health security by supporting capacity building for prevention and control of biological, natural, or man-made health threats through the further roll-out of a sustainable training programme in intervention epidemiology <=> Collaboration between MediLabSecure and MediPIET is crucial to ensure necessary links between lab capabilities and field epidemiologists



MEDIPIET, PREVIOUS PHASES





- ➤ Sustainable tailor made regional training programme in field epidemiology, including 2-year 'learning-by-doing' course and on job-training. (MediPIET) ⇔ regional competent workforce in intervention epidemiology / regional network of trainers/supervisors and institutions;
- ▶ Launched in 2012, MediPIET 1: preparatory phase (contract lfS/2012/307-293/) ⇔ ECDC;
- > 2014-2018: MediPIET 2 (IfS/2013/329-859, 6 400 000 €);



FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY





20 PUBLIC HEALTH INSTITUTES







- Albania
- Algeria
- Armenia
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Egypt
- Georgia
- Kosovo*
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Moldova
- Montenegro
- Morocco

- Republic of North Macedonia
- Palestine**
- Serbia
- Tunisia
- Ukraine
- Observers: Israel and Turkey
- <u>EU countries</u>: France, Greece and Spain

**"This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence."

^{**}Instead of Occupied Territories of Palestine



MEDIPIET P74 (2019-2021, 1 859 800 €)





- ✓ Organization of a FETP dedicated to a new cohort of national fellows from 12 countries with a MediPIET Training Site
- ✓ Training for senior and mid-career professionals in field epidemiology
- ✓ Increased exchange on public health knowledge and methodologies between EU and non-EU countries
- ✓ Encourage regional networking and develop further sustainable country capacity to deal with health security challenges





MEDIPIET P74 (2019-2021, 1 859 800 €)














SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF

THE WHO'S INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS





STRONGLABS P76 (2019-2021, 2 500 000 €)





« Preventing biological risks increased by environmental and climate change by strengthening Public Health Laboratories - (STRONGLABS) »

In the continuity of Project 40 (IFS/2013/332312, 6 400 000 €):
funded by the CBRN CoE initiative and implemented by WHO

⇒ strengthening health laboratories to ensure a correct IHR implementation and minimize potential biological risks in some countries covered by the Project MediLabSecure.

To minimize potential biological risks related to climate change by improving the detection of, response to, and recovery from outbreaks and health emergencies <=> enhancing and sustaining functional public health laboratory capacities to test specimens and report results in a safe, secure, timely and reliable manner.



What is STRONGLABS





- STRONGLABS aims to minimize potential biological risks related to climate change by improving the detection of, response to, and recovery from infectious disease outbreaks and health emergencies.
- Actions will focus on enhancing and sustaining functional public health laboratory capacities to test specimens and report results in a safe, secure, timely and reliable manner.
- To improve core public health laboratory indicators as defined in the IHR's monitoring and evaluation framework.











1.1. LABORATORY SPECIMEN REFERRAL AND TRANSPORT SYSTEMS are strengthened to ensure early detection and timely confirmation of disease outbreaks.



1.2. LABORATORY BIOSAFETY AND BIOSECURITY regimes are implemented to support storage, handling and sharing of biological materials in a safe and secure manner.



1.3. Access to **QUALITY ASSURED LABORATORY TESTING CAPACITY** is ensured for priority diseases for timely, reliable identification and characterization.







GLOBAL (HQ)

global guideline & tool development

(for all WHO Member States)

- <u>Global guidance for specimen collection during outbreaks</u>
<u>revised</u>

- <u>Shippers of infectious substances training program</u> <u>enhanced</u>
- Global EQA developed for viral haemorrhagic fevers

EUROPEAN REGION

53 countries

- UZBEKISTAN
- TAJIKISTAN
- KYRGYSTAN

- Piloting specimen transport systems
 - Biosafety/biosecurity trainings
- Biosafety/biosecurity regulation development
 - Mentoring on laboratory quality

EASTERN MEDITERRAN EAN REGION

22 countries

• IRAQ

• TUNISIA

- Regional guidelines for new diagnostic technologies

- Review strategic frameworks for strengthening health laboratories
 - Train shippers of infectious substances
- Laboratory policy & biosafety/biosecurity regulation development

AFRICAN REGION

47 countries

- BURKINA FASO
- MALI
- NIGER

Mapping and enhancing specimen referral mechanisms

- Biosafety/biosecurity trainings
- <u>Technical diagnostics trainings for priority pathogens</u>
 - Supporting laboratory quality audits







I thank you for your attention

Questions?